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Abstract 
The paper examines the judicial power of discretion, the meaning, the perspective of the use, and certain legally 
stipulated limitations to the exercise of the power by judges; by asking the question of whether in certain 
circumstances, where the laws fail to provide definite solutions for matters before the court, and the courts 
embark on interpolation in other to identify and apply related concepts and rules to arrive at a decision, amounts 
to making laws?, A fact which judges often deny, yet seldom create  fresh rules and theories in order to fill the 
vacuum left by legislation. After all, a court would not simply throw out a case simply because there is no law 
that directly regulates the subject for which the court is called upon to decide.  
 
Introduction 
It is often argued that judges exercise enormous powers, the extent of the power is mostly imbedded deep in the 
law, leaving both the judge and lawyer appearing before the judge prancing about the exact scope of 
interpretation of the law. The prime duty of the judiciary as a constitutional arm of the Government is to through 
the Courts interpret laws enacted by the Legislature. Judges interpret these laws all the time even when no clear 
guidelines or parameters or laid down procedure of interpretation are handed down by the legislature. In the 
situation, the court finds itself in a state of absolute and unbridled discretion; whereby the judge must make 
findings and deliver a decision no matter what it takes even when the law is blurred on the core of the link 
between the law and the question for determination or facts before the court. This boundless powers of the 
judicial authority are sometimes abused, or misapplied; hence the gradual simultaneous growth of the checks and 
limitations to such judicial discretional authority. 
 
Common Law and Judicial Discretion 
The common law has its origin in the middle Ages of the England, and developed from mainly judicial customs 
and traditions that made up the local systems, and was common to the whole of England. But long ago these 
local systems disappeared2, and for centuries the phrase “the common law” has meant the basic law of the land 
which was developed by the judges of the old common law Courts3. Its distinctive characteristic is that it is 
almost entirely a development of the judges; its principles are to be discovered in previous cases, and not in a 
comprehensive code, such as the Code Civil of France,4 or the Nigeria’s Penal Code or Criminal Code5. 
The notion that the rules of the common law are derived from previous cases therefore not made by the judge 
instant is dismissed as unsatisfying; especially when enquiring as to the ultimate source of the rules expounded 
in the previous cases, there must at some time have been a first case for which previous rulings gave no 
guidance. The previous and initial ruling is usually the discretionary brainchild of a Judge. 
Nevertheless, and even by the common law standards, the judicial system is designed in a manner that certain 
limitations are always placed in the way of the courts, to define, refine, qualify and regulate the exercise of such 
powers, through the law, practice or convention; what is clear however is that no legal power or assigned 
authority is without limit. 
 
Interpreting the Constitution and other Legislation 
Constitutions and most codified legislation are usually framed by adopting a concise and compact approach to 
the issues it addresses or covers. The respective sections or parts of the written laws are a summary of the 
intendment of the framers of such a law, the court is thereby conferred with the onerous task of appropriately 
interpreting the intention of the framers, and properly applying the law to achieve the desired result. This is 
complex tasks which require the judge to add flesh to the rather bare provision of the law to cloth the law with its 
intended objective, and also, design for the law a model for practical application. This task once carried out by a 
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 Senior Lecturer at Nasarawa State University, Keffi. 
2
 With the Norman Conquest of England in the year 1066, the invading Normans united all the axles and settlements around the mainland 
England under one rule, the common law were the laws that were generally acceptable by all the classes and settlements and applied by the 
Common Law Courts. 
3The Court of Kings Bench, the Court of Common Pleas, and the Court of Exchequer. 
4
 See A. E. W. Park The Sources of Nigerian Law (1986) Lagos AUP Limited. 
5
 once a law is codified the Courts are restricted to interpretation and application to facts only, as against the classic english law when 
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superior court, continues to be abided by lower courts, coordinate courts, and subsequent similar cases by the 
same superior court. 
The doctrine of judicial precedence or case law requires the court to adopt all means possible towards applying 
legislation by deploying methods that enable the law to work or add what may be missing in the law to bring it in 
tune with reality of applicability. It is this enormous power of qualifying laws where necessary, and making 
additions to laws where needed in order to make the law work that provokes the question that is asked; in that 
situation what was the source of the rule applied by the judge? In relation to common law Park explains; 
A formal answer that is occasionally given by the judges of common law courts in the past was 
that the rule to be applied originates in the “common custom of the realm”. That is, however 
artificial and modern judges no longer employ it as a justification for their decision upon “cases of 
first impression”. The generally acceptable principle however is that; in the last analysis the 
decision of the judges do not merely expound rules that existed before, but rather themselves 
create the principles of common law. Nevertheless it should be concluded from this that all case 
law is in fact legislation disguised as the exposition of pre-determined rules. The judges hardly 
ever admit themselves to be making new law; it is rare indeed for a judge to be as frank as was 
Lord Denning M.R. in the case of Att.-Gen. v. Butterworth1 wherein the learned Jurist confirmed 
that “it may be that there is no authority to be found in books, but if this be so all I can say is that 
the sooner we make one the better.”2 
While in very rare situations, judges in fact make what may appear like fresh enactment having no exact or direct 
link or root to any existing enactment, where the connection to an existing enactment is more or less constructive 
or remote, the vast majority of cases of the law administered by the judges is perfectly well established 
beforehand, and decision of the judge is not more than an application of it to particular facts, having little or no 
effect on its contents. And even when the courts invoke their discretion by establishing new rules or alter old 
ones, they do not in general feel themselves free to declare openly that since no existing rule precisely covers the 
case, they are going to formulate the one they consider most appropriate. Instead they undertake a subtle and 
highly skilled process of considering the law on analogous subjects, and combining various features from some 
or all of them, to produce a fresh rule exactly applicable to the issue before them. Occasionally, they may take a 
rule a little further than it has been taken before, so helping to create a new principle of law, but such cases are 
highly exceptional, and furthermore most of the judges take a strict view of the limits within which they can 
make these extensions and modifications. 
These powers of judges well founded in convention and practice of our legal system is often regulated either by 
law, or by the same conventions, practices and principles of law. The powers are generally regarded as 
discretionary powers of judges or discretion of courts mainly because the judge has ample right to decide as he 
wishes and only guided by conscience and the basic principles of rule of law. 
Thus, it is imperative to briefly delve into these well laid out conventions, practices and established principles of 
law, to populate and amplify the regulations and defined limits, as adumbrated, for the exercise of these 
discretionary powers. 
 
Discretion, Judicial Discretion and Separation of Powers 
Discretion is understood to be a liberty to act at pleasure, the power of making free choices unconstraint by 
external agencies3. By judicial discretion it presupposes that the courts enjoy powers to act at pleasure and 
without external influences and constraints. The question of discretionary powers of courts is well and long 
settled, infact beyond the question of exercise of legislative interpretative powers to the suggestion that; in the 
last analysis the decision of judges do not merely expound rules that existed before, but rather themselves create 
new principles of law. This is because the statement that rules of law as being derived from existing legislation 
or previous cases is unsatisfying; been that legislations will always require first time interpretation by the courts 
of law to be understood and also for judicial precedence to be formed, so also the courts will have to reach a 
decision anyway when faced with an issue whether legislation properly covers the issue or not, and whether an 
earlier task of interpreting the legislation has been carried out or not.  
By the principle of separation of powers, the basic responsibility of the courts as enunciated in all statutes is the 
interpretation of an existing law. Yet, an “unquantifiable” power lies in the judges’ hands where the law is silent 
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on a matter before the court. Aptly, the first time scenario offers ample discretion in giving life to the legislation 
and amplifying the intention and mindset of the framers and makers of the legislation in question. In that 
situation; What was the source of the basis of the interpretation adopted? And/or the source of the rule applied by 
the judge where no law covering the subject of analysis exist?1 The judge is bound to decide anyway, discretion 
is invoked and conclusions are drawn from somewhat related rules, or the set of facts as presented is somehow 
married to the law or laws that are closest in meaning to it. 
That is the expanse of judicial powers. The discretionary powers of judges arise in the final analysis in filling up 
gaps not fully covered by existing legislation or providing flesh and proper interpretation of an existing 
legislation. In the vast majority of cases the law administered by the judge was perfectly well established 
beforehand, and his decision was no more than an application of it to particular facts having little or no effect on 
its contents, but discretion craves in determination of applicability of a specific previous decision on a new case. 
In the grant of injunctive and equitable reliefs across all nature of cases, the judge enjoys enormous powers in 
the grant or refusal. 
 As such, the controversy that rages on is no more the question of whether indeed judges are armed with such 
discretions, but what are the limits of the exercise of such discretionary powers, the parameters for 
implementation. 
 
Conceptual Framework 
The resolution of a matter based on the discretion of the court must depend on the facts and circumstances of 
each case2. This takes us to the need to briefly examine certain avenues of judicial discretion and peculiar 
parameters guiding the exercise of such powers in each incident, situation and case, approaching the argument 
from juxtaposed angles of anti and pro judicial discretion at this stage would afford us the benefit of the 
assimilating the respective contexts. This is best understood from the varied definitions offered by scholars and 
lawyers. 
Isaacs3 explains that on matters of discretion of the court, lawyers are often confronted with two series of dicta 
that are repeated with but little variation almost as a matter of course. First, there is that group which decries 
discretion as the rule of tyranny and would limit it in every possible way. A distinction is drawn between 
discretion in the ordinary sense and judicial discretion, which is said to be “legal” or regulated by rule. 
… discretion herein is the art of being circumspect, wary and discrete in a bid to arrive at a reasonable and 
plausible judgment.4 
Black’s Law Dictionary5 has this to say; 
Judicial and legal discretion. These terms are applied to the discretionary action of a Judge or 
court, and mean discretion bounded by the rules and principles of law, and not arbitrary, 
capricious, or unrestrained. It is not the indulgence of a judicial whim, but the exercise of 
judicial judgment, based on facts and guided by law, or the equitable decision of what is just and 
proper under the circumstances. It is a legal discretion to be exercised in discerning the course 
prescribed by law and is not to give effect to the will of the judge, but to that of the law. The 
exercise of discretion where there are two alternative provisions of law applicable, under either 
of which court could proceed. A liberty or privilege to decide and act in accordance with what is 
fair and equitable under the peculiar circumstances of the particular case, guided by the spirit 
and principles of the law.6 
Discretionary power means the power to choose between different options, when each option is viable within the 
framework of the law. Where there is no choice, there can be no discretion. Thus, when the language of a legal 
text mandates the court to act in a certain way, the court has no choice and has to act accordingly.7 
 
The word “discretion” when applied to judicial officers, is defined in Black Law Dictionary, as meaning:  
"A power or right conferred upon them by law of acting in certain circumstances, according to 
the dictates of their own judgment and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience 
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of others. It connotes action taken in light or reason as applied to all facts and with view to rights 
of all parties to action while having regard for what is right and equitable under all 
circumstances and law."1 
It follows, therefore, that a judicial officer saddled with the responsibility of exercising discretion is required to 
arrive at the decision in every case or situation based on the facts placed before him in the very case and apply 
the applicable law. His decision is therefore likely to vary from case to case since the circumstances in each case 
may vary. The question of stereotype or strict application of the rule of judicial precedent would not be of 
importance. 
 
Judicial discretion is a very broad concept because of the different kinds of decisions made by judges and 
because of the different limits placed on those decisions. Section 6 (6) of the Nigerian Constitution2 confers 
enormous powers on the court of law, leaving the courts the wide leverage to determine the extent of its powers; 
Section 6 (6) states;  
 The judicial powers vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section -  
(a) shall extend, notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this constitution, to all inherent 
powers and sanctions of a court of law3 
The Nigerian courts pursuant to this ample licence have over the years carved a domain of operation for 
themselves, formulating the basic principles of law and developing the Nigerian legal system based on respective 
documentary and historical sources and obviating the necessity of additional enactments to support the judicial 
evolution and adventures4.  
 
In practice, the constitutional powers of the Nigerian Courts are largely similar to that of the United States of 
America (US). Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution also grants the judiciary broad power, which 
extends "to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and 
Treaties made." Judges' decisions must be made based on the "rule of law," which, in the United States, derives 
not only from statutes passed by Congress but also from the tenets of the Constitution. In addition, Common 
Law, or judge-made law, provides limits based on the principle of Stare Decisis, which holds that a court's 
decision in a particular case must comport with the Rule of Law as they have been determined by that court or by 
other, higher-level courts, in previous cases. Legal conclusions that do not fit within the prescribed limits of both 
statutory and common law may be overturned by a reviewing court if that court determines that the conclusions 
were an abuse of judicial discretion5. 
 
At a certain period in time, the sentencing of those convicted of crimes the US was almost entirely within the 
discretion of judges. Judges could take into account various mitigating factors (circumstances reducing the 
degree of blame or fault attributed to the offender) and craft a punishment that most appropriately fit the crime. 
For example, a first-time petty offender convicted of shoplifting might be sentenced to Parole and community 
service under the US system.6Similarly, the Nigerian Courts usually consider seriously the plea for mitigation of 
sentence of a first offender; the courts would often reduce the sentence to barest minimum for such offenders.    
The US, in order to curb the limitless discretion of judges and the arbitrary use of the power in such 
circumstances, introduced what they called the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. With the implementation of 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines and with mandatory minimum sentencing legislation, which was passed in both 
US Congress and the US states, judges no longer had the broad latitude to make the sentence that fits the crime 
and the defendant. In some states, first-time offenders have been sent to jail for life for the possession of large 
amounts of controlled substances. Many federal judges in US must incarcerate parole violators for minor parole 
violations because the guidelines specifically direct them to and severely limit their sentencing choices. A 
judge's failure to abide by the sentencing guidelines in issuing a sentence would constitute an abuse of judicial 
discretion.7 
 
                                                 
1
 Blacks Law Dicitionary 6th edition, 1990, page 466 
2
 Constitution of Nigeria 1999 (as amended). 
3
 Ibid, Section 6 (6). 
4
 See for Instance S. 45 (1) of the Interpretation Act, Laws of theFederation of Nigeria, 1990, which empowers the High Courts to apply the 
common law of England, the doctrine of equity together with the statutes of general application in the resolution of disputes among 
Nigerians. 
5
 The Free Dictionary, Farlex visited on the 27th January, 2013.  
6
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7
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In view of the leverage allowed the courts by the Nigeria’s Constitution to exercise judicial discretions; The 
courts have over time evolved a perspective of the exercise of judicial discretion to be governed and regulated by 
case law, which requires that such discretion must be exercised judiciously and judicially.  
 
Meaning of Judicial and Judicious 
On what constitutes judicial and judicious, the Court in the case of African Continental Bank v. Nnamani1 
held;  
The exercise of the court’s discretion is said to be judicial if the Judge invokes the power in his 
capacity as Judge qua law. In other words, an exercise of a discretionary power will be said to be 
judicial, if the power is exercised in accordance with the enabling statutes. On the other hand, an 
exercise of a discretionary power is said to be judicious if it carries or conveys the intellectual 
wisdom or prudent intellectual capacity of the Judge as judex. In this second situation, the exercise 
of the discretion must be replete with such wisdom and tenacity of mind and purpose. The exercise 
must be based on a sound and sensible judgment with a view to doing justice to the parties. 
But, discretion is discretion, whether it wears any of the two qualifying expressions mentioned above (judicious 
and judicial), only when it is exercised by the court according to law and good judgment. Discretion is not 
discretion if its exercise is based on the court’s sentiments or premeditated pet ideas on the matter, completely 
outside the dictates of either the enabling law or good judgment, as the case may be.2 
In criminal cases, judges exercise enormous discretion; from the commencement of the trial to the end, 
prominent of which is in the grant of bail and sentencing. In civil cases courts exercise discretion in many 
respects, most common of which is in grant or refusal to grant injunctions and adjournment of proceedings etc. 
We shall discuss a few of the instances in this paper. 
Bail 
The decision to grant or not to grant an application for bail is at the discretion of the Court. However, such 
discretion must be exercised judicially and judiciously having regard to the right of the accused person to his 
liberty until he is proven guilty to the crime alleged, and the need for the society to be protected from the 
grievous criminal act. See the case of Dokubo-Asari v. FRN3. See also the case of Bulama v. Federal 
Republic of Nigeria.4 The exercise of discretion by the court in the grant or refusal of bail to an accused is 
governed by several factors which are not necessarily consent as they do change with changing circumstances 
and time. They cannot be regarded as immutable and applicable for all times. See Bulama v. FRN.5 The 
Supreme Court in the case of Adamu Suleiman v. Commissioner of Police, Plateau State held; 
It is submitted in reply, in the respondent's brief that the criteria that should guide the courts 
in deciding whether to grant or refuse an application for bail are well laid down by this court 
in numerous decisions of this court, particularly in Dokubo-Asari v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 375) 558; at 572; and Bamayi v. The State (2001) FWLR (Pt, 
46) 956 at 984. It is also argued that the bailability of an accused depend largely on the 
weight the judge attached to one or several of the criteria open to him in any given case. The 
court below in this case is said to have exercised its discretion judicially and judiciously 
when it dismissed the appellants' appeal having regard to the facts tendered in the case. 
It is further submitted that the presumption of innocence does not make the grant of bail automatic since there is 
always the discretion to refuse bail if the court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for believing that the 
applicant for bail pending trial would abscond or interfere with witnesses or otherwise obstruct the course of 
justice. The crucial factor is said to be the existence of substantial ground for the belief that he would do so. 
Also, since the issue of grant or refusal of bail is a discretionary matter, previous decisions are not of much 
value. They are therefore said not to be binding but can only offer broad guidelines as each exercise of discretion 
depends on the facts of each case.  
It is therefore settled that the decision whether to grant or refuse an application for bail involves exercise of 
judicial discretion in every case. The criteria to be followed in taking such a decision as laid down by courts 
include; 
(i) the nature of the charge; 
(ii) the strength of the evidence which supports the charge; 
                                                 
1(1991) 4 NWLR (Pt. 186) 486 
2
 On the principles of exercising discretion by the court, see generally University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 156 at 175. 
Williams v. Williams (1987) 2 NWLR (PL54) 66; Agbolohun v. Balogun (1990) 2 NWLR (Pt134) 576. 
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(iii) the gravity of the punishment in the event of conviction; 
(iv) the previous criminal record of the accused, if any; 
(v) the probability that the accused may not surrender himself for trial; 
(vi) the likelihood of the accused interfering with witnesses or may suppress any evidence that may 
incriminate him; 
(vii) the likelihood of further charge being brought against the accused; and 
(viii) the necessity to procure medical or social report pending final disposal of the case.1 
 
SENTENCING 
The Black’s Law Dictionary2 defines sentence as “judgment formally pronounced by the court or judge upon the 
defendant after conviction in a criminal prosecution, imposing punishments to be inflicted”. 
 
The Nigerian Law Dictionary3 defines sentencing as the judgment of a court pronounced, especially in a criminal 
proceeding, in respect of the nature of sanctions to be imposed after an accused person has been adjudged guilty 
of the offence he is charged for. 
 
The Oxford Concise Law Dictionary 7th Edition defines sentence as the “judgment of a court particularly in an 
ecclesiastical or criminal cause”. 
 
A sentence of the court can be defined as a definite disposition order issued by a court or other competent 
tribunal against a person standing trial, at the conclusion of a criminal trial, subsequent to finding of guilt against 
him and must be an order4 which is definite in its nature, type and quantum5. The Criminal Code and the Penal 
Code as well as the offence-creating statutes specify the quantum of sentence while the sentences themselves 
find their legitimacy in the Criminal legislations applicable at the states and federal levels as well as the 
Probations of Offenders Law in the case of probation orders made in the Northern States6. 
 
Sentencing is a very broad field accommodating different approach and ideas. Also, sentencing is an exercise of 
a discretionary power that is little guided in a country such as Nigeria. Hence, the power presents “sentencers” / 
judges with a very wide playing field and accommodates individual inclinations and approaches or solutions to 
the same problem. The differences in approaches, however, become a problem in society when it presents the 
criminal justice system as irrational, inconsistent and unjust. The relative recent concern with sentencing practice 
beyond the legal provisions undergirding it has paced by other experts aside lawyers and judges who have drawn 
attention to the importance of questioning both sentence legislation and sentencing practice as well the 
philosophies or logic upon which these rest.7 
 
Offenders are guaranteed fair hearing under the Constitution of Nigeria.8 It is also settled law that no one can be 
punished for an offence unless it is contained in a written law.9 Personal liberty10 of citizens is also guaranteed 
and can only be lost or taken in due execution of sentence or order of court after conviction and the finding of 
guilt. 
 
The provisions in laws that criminalize acts provide sanctions for breach of the laws and commission of such 
acts or omission provided therein. The sanctions are defined and stipulated and the judge is expected to comply 
                                                 
1
 See Bamaiyi v. The State (2001) 8 NWLR (Pt. 715) 270; Dokubo-Asari v. Federal Republic of Nigeria (2007) All FWLR (Pt. 375) 558; 
Abacha v. The State (2002) 5 NWLR (Pt. 761) 638; Ani v. The State (2002) 1 NWLR (Pt. 747) 217; Ekwenugo v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (2001) 6 NWLR (Pt. 708) 9; and Eyu v. The State (1988) 2 NWLR (Pt. 78) 607. 
 
2
 5th Edition 
3
 Nchi . I., Nigerian Law Dictionary, Published by Greenworld Publishing Company Limited (Jos-2000) 
4
 The term Order here refers also to sentencing but mainly refers to order made after conviction as against other types of orders that may 
made by the court in the course of the trial. See Section 248, Criminal Procedure Act, Cap C41 LFN, 2004, Similarly, Section 305, Criminal 
Procedure Code, Cap 30 of the LFN, 1963 which interchangeably uses the phrases “any sentence or order of a Criminal Court”.   
5
 A. A. Adeyemi: “Administration of Justice in Nigeria: Sentencing, in Yemi Osibanjo and Awa Kalu (Eds.) Law Development and 
Administration in Nigeria, (Lagos: FMoJ, 1990). P109. And cited in Peter A. Anyebe: Sentencing in Criminal Cases in Nigeria and the Case 
for Paradigmatic Shifts. Published in www.nials-nigeria.org/journals/peter. last visited on the 11th /7/13. 
6
 P. A. Anyebe: “Sentencing in Criminal Cases in Nigeria and the Case for Paradigmatic Shifts. Published in www.nials-
nigeria.org/journals/peter. last visited on the 11th /7/13. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Section 36 1999 Constitution as amended. 
9
 See Section 36 (12) 1999 Constitution as amended. 
10
 Section 35 of the 1999 Constitution as amended. 
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with the injunctions spelled out in both the descriptive aspect, and the punishment part of the provision. A 
punishment provision in a criminal law presents itself in two ways; the first is where the quantum of sentence is 
fixed by law, where the discretion of the court is fore-closed on account of fixed provision of the law, as in most 
capital crime provisions carrying death penalty, once guilt is established the punishment must be carried out in 
full. The second is the type of provision laded with discretional opportunity for the judge. 
 
Sentences Fixed By Law   
Where the quantum of sentence is fixed by law, the discretion of the court is foreclosed on account of fixed 
provision of the law, as in most capital crime provisions carrying death penalty, once guilt is established the 
punishment must be carried out in full. Hence, after an accused is convicted of an offence, the judge must pass a 
sentence on him. The sentence passed must be one prescribed for the offence under the statute creating it1 and 
the judge cannot differ. There are also certain non-capital offences with fixed minimum sentence. 
 
Death Sentence 
Under Nigerian criminal law various offences are punishable by death across the Federation including murder,2 
treason,3 and treachery,4 conspiracy to commit treason,5 directing and controlling or presiding at an unlawful trial 
by ordeal which results in death6 and armed robbery.7 More recently, kidnapping has been added to the list in 
Abia, Imo and Akwa Ibom States8 and oil theft and crude oil bunkering in Rivers and Enugu State. The 
introduction of Sharia based criminal law in some states in Northern Nigeria has widened the number of capital 
offences to include adultery, sodomy, lesbianism and rape.9  
 
Where the death sentence is prescribed against a convicted felon, the sentence is mandatory. The judge has no 
discretion in the matter, after an accused has been found guilty of a capital offence; the only sentence open to the 
court to impose is that of death which the highest punishment in the array of punishments under Nigerian law. 
 
Non-Capital Offences with Fixed or Mandatory Minimum Sentences. 
There are certain offences with minimum sentences stipulated by law, and in such instances, the court is 
mandated on conviction to impose nothing below the stipulated sentence. For example section 12 of the ICPC 
Act 200010 provides; 
 
Any person who, being employed in the public service, knowingly acquires or holds, directly or indirectly, 
otherwise than as a member of a registered joint stock company consisting of more than twenty (20) persons, a 
private interest in any contract, agreement or investment emanating from or connected with the department or 
office in which he is employed or which is made on account of the public office, and shall on conviction be 
liable to imprisonment for seven (7) years. 
 
Most of the other provisions of the ICPC Act make such mandatory provisions by the use of the word shall11 of 
which by the trite doctrine of statutory interpretation “the word shall connotes mandatory discharge of a duty or 
obligation, and when the word in respect of a provision of the law that requirement must be met”.12  
 
It is a pre-supposition that where any penal provision deploys the word shall in qualifying a specific sentence, 
then the sentence therein must be imposed. 
 
Discretionary Sentence 
There are usually three types of situations in which a court can impose a discretionary sentence; 
                                                 
1
 Oluwatoyin Doherty: Criminal Procedure in Nigeria: Law and Practice. Blackstone Press Limited, 1999, page 317 also cited in P. A. 
Anyebe supra page 160. 
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 S. 319 CC and S. 220 PC.  See generally P. A. Anyebe page 160. 
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 S. 37 (1) CC; S. 410 PC. 
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 S. 49 A. CC. 
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 S. 37 (2) CC; S. 411 PC. 
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 S. 208 PC. 
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1.  Where the law simply provides a penalty without stipulating its maximum; 
2. Where the law prescribe a statutory minimum above which the court may discretionarily impose any sentence; 
and  
3. Where the law provides a range between a statutory minimum and maximum leaving the court to exercise the 
discretion in any manner it deems fit and appropriate within the prescribed range.1   
 
The judge in exercise of discretion in the award of punishment is expected to act within a set benchmark defined 
by parameters that are not exactly sanctioned by law, but mostly by practice, convention and judicial precedence, 
with rather weak and non- binding directives stipulating conditions for exercise of discretion.2 
 
The allocutus, mitigating and aggravating factors are all conditions that influence the exercise of discretion by a 
judge in awarding sentence on a convict but no law particularly obliges the judge to adopt any of this factors. 
 
Allocutus is the statement made before the court by a felony or treason convict before his sentencing, appealing 
for leniency in the sentence yet to be awarded. Allocutus or plea of mitigation in certain parlance influences the 
mind of the judge to exercise discretion favorably. And where the judge is swayed by the plea or appeal of the 
convict or his counsel, a lighter or more liberal sentence is imposed. This consideration confers on the judge an 
ample leverage to select a sentence that is less than the maximum in favour of the most minimum provided by 
the law. The judge is not guided by any statutory standard for determining when to be lenient and when not. 
However such factors as mitigating or aggravating factor mentioned assist the judge in determining when to 
temper justice with mercy by exercising discretion in favour of far less than the maximum punishment provided 
by the law, or going lenient by imposing far less than stipulated by the law. Factors that may invoke leniency 
normally referred to as mitigating factors are the old age of the offender, plea of guilt without wasting the time of 
the court and show of remorse, membership of the same family, good character or record of been a good 
Samaritan etc while factors that may lead to invocation of the maximum sentence provided by the law are 
normally called Aggravating Factor e.g prevalence of such a crime and the need to educate and deter potential 
offenders, the serious nature of the offence, bad character of the offender or cruelty/callousness in commission of 
the crime, occupying a position of trust and using the colour of the office to perpetrate the crime as in cases of 
corruption by public officers etc. 
 
Although there is the general presupposition that sentence can only be imposed in tandem with the enabling 
statute i.e the Constitution or the other codes, this hardly defines or refines the ambit of judicial discretion in the 
award of sentence. It nevertheless highlights and helps in the formulation of the judicial rule that discretionary 
powers of the judge or magistrate must be judicially and judiciously exercised.3 In Abanyi v. State.4It was held 
that the judge has discretion but should state the factor that influenced his decision.  
 
Some other consideration that judges pay attention to are the aims and objectives, or purpose that should be 
achieved by punishing the offender for the crime convicted. Most of the objectives are rooted in philosophy 
where scholars have identified and adumbrated the objects of punishment and that each sentence to aim at 
achieving a defined goal. Goals ranging from Retribution, educative or the utilitarian object of punishment, 
encompassing deterrence, rehabilitation and reform, and disablement theories. This philosophical theories define 
the objective of criminal law and punishment in particular, that a sentence in all situations most seek to attain a 
goal of either deterring the offender and other prospective offenders from committing the punishment, or 
permanently disabling the offender from further crimes by imprisoning him or physical amputation. Achieve a 
goal of rehabilitating or reforming the offender or educating the public about the existence and consequence of 
such a crime, or deterrence principle which seeks to deter the offender or potential offenders from committing 
the same crime. 
 
In as much as this judicially formulated rule and the other considerations in exercising discretion in sentencing 
are meant to be served, there are no hard and fast rules on this point. Because they are not statutorily backed, 
there is nothing mandatory about been strict in compliance with the rules and considerations by the judges. 
                                                 
1
 Yomi Okubote: Current Issues on Sentencing, Custodial Reforms & The Criminal Justice Administration in Nigeria. Written in Honour of 
Hon. Justice Lawal Hassan Gummi, OFR.  
2
 Sse the case of University of Lagos v. Olaniyan (1985) 1 NWLR (Pt.1) 156 at 175. Stating the conditions for discretionary power to be 
judicious and judicial. 
3
 Essien v. Cop 5NMLR 449 Pg 381 cited in Yomi Okubote supra page 73. 
4
 1995 9 NWLR 369. Pg. 1. 
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Historically, judges have had considerable discretion over the determination of criminal sentences. Except for a 
few cases mostly capital offences with strict minimum sentences imbedded in the laws and imposed on 
conviction, most other criminal provisions in our statute stipulate maximum sentences and without a baseline for 
least punishments for such offences referred. Under the American legal appellation referred to as indeterminate 
sentencing, which allows a wide range of discretion for judges to elect to either be lenient or strict in the 
application of the specific provision during sentencing. While such discretion theoretically allows judges to tailor 
sentences to the circumstances of individual crimes and criminals, thereby achieving a sort of ex-post fairness, it 
also permits variation in sentences that may not be warranted by the observable facts of the case, reflecting 
instead the judge's own preferences and sometimes biases. The deterrent essence of punishment is defeated 
because judicial discretion makes it difficult for potential offenders to predict the consequences of their actions, 
an impediment to the deterrence function of criminal punishment1. 
 
Injunctions 
An injunction is an equitable order restraining the party to whom it is directed from the things specified in the 
order or requiring in exceptional situations the performance or a specified act. In other  words, the order of 
injunction is available to restrain a party from the repetition or continuation of the particular wrongful act 
complaint of, with the aim of preserving the RES or subject matter of the case. See the case of Adenuga v. 
Odumeru2 and Odutola v. Lawal3. Injunction is a discretionary remedy available to courts in situations where 
there is a clear and present danger of distortion or tempering with the state of affairs or things subject matter of a 
pending or determined suit.  
There are different kinds of injunctions. These are namely: exparte/ interim injunction, interlocutory injunction, 
perpetual injunction, mareva injunction, and Anton Piller injunction. Apart from interlocutory and perpetual 
injunctions, the rest have limited application and are conceived of being of extremely short duration. See the case 
of G.M.C. (UK) Ltd v. Medicair W/A Ltd4. We shall there only briefly consider Perpetual and Interlocutory 
injunctions. 
 
Perpetual Injunction 
A court may only grant a perpetual injunction at the suit of a plaintiff in support of a right known to law or 
equity. The plaintiff’s conduct must also be taken into consideration in determining whether or not to grant the 
injunction see the case of Biyo v. Aku5 and Afrotec v. MIA6. 
A perpetual injunction can only be granted after a trial, when the applicant has established both his rights and the 
actual or threatened infringement thereof7. Perpetual injunction will only be ordered, whenever the tort of 
trespass to property is committed, under two main circumstances, namely: where there would be an irreparable 
damage or if the act complaint of would be destructive where an injunction to restrain it is not ordered; and 
where a failure to exercise the jurisdiction would lead to multiplicity of suits.8 The grant of the relief of perpetual 
orders, which should naturally flow from the declaratory orders sought by the claimant in a suit and granted by 
the court.9 
 
Interlocutory Injunction 
The discretionary remedy or order of interlocutory injunction is an equitable remedy that is available to restrain 
the Defendant from repetition or continuance of a wrongful act in relation to the subject matter of the suit “the 
res” and to maintain the status quo between the parties pending the determination of the substantive suit. See the 
case of C.G.C. Nig Ltd Vs Baba10. If the Plaintiff is not restrained from his acts in relation to the res, the 
judgment of the court will be rendered nugatory in the event the suit is determined in favour of the applicant. 
In an application of this nature, the following factors as laid down in Kotoye Vs CBN11; Obeya Memorial 
Hospital Vs A-G., Federation 1 and a host of cases are considered by the court, to wit:  
                                                 
1
 See Generally Miceli, Thomas J., supra 
2
 (2001) 10 WRN 104 SC. 
3
 (2001) 11 WRN 34 CA. 
4
 (1998) 2 NWLR (Pt. 536) 86 CA. 
5
 (1996) 1 NWLR (Pt. 422) 1 CA. 
6
 (2001)6 WRN 65 SC. 
7
 See Globe Fishing Ind Ltd v. Coker (1990) 7 NWLR (Pt. 162) 265 SC. 
8
 See the case of Onabanjo v. Efunpitan (1996) 7 NWLR (Pt. 463) 756 CA. 
9
 See the case of E.S.C.S.C.v. Geofrey (2006)18 NWLR (Pt. 1011) 293 CA. 
10
  (2003) 23 WRN 44 at 49 Ratio 6 
11
 (2000) 16 WRN 71 
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1. Whether there is or are serious question(s) to be tried. 
2. Whether the applicant has a legal right or interest to be protected in the suit or on the subject matter that 
warrants the grant of the injunctive order. 
3. Whether the damages that will occur if the act is not restrained by an injunction are irreparable or are 
such that cannot be adequately compensated in monetary terms if the applicant succeeds at the end of 
the trial. 
4. Whether the balance of convenience is on the applicant side and more justice will therefore result in 
granting the application than in refusing it. 
5. The applicant is required to give an undertaking as to damages. See the case of C.G.C. Nig. Ltd Vs 
Baba2.  
6.  Whether there is or are serious question(s) to be tried. 
In order to determine the question as to whether there is a serious question to be tried the court has to look at the 
affidavit and pleadings and an applicant for interlocutory injunction has to only show that there is a fair 
question(s) to raise as to the existence of the right which he alleges. See the case of Itex Ltd Vs First inland 
Bank Plc3. 
It is therefore sufficient for the applicant of interlocutory injunction to establish that there exists a question fit to 
be tried or adjudicated by the court to satisfy the requirement of triable issue; there lies the discretionary power, 
to determine whether the facts as presented indeed fulfill the conditions as stated.  
Adjournments 
In the consideration of application for adjournment, the court is expected to balance between two main factors (i) 
the need to dispose off the case without delay; and (ii) the right of the applicant to be heard without undue 
coercion. In balancing these factors, the court is guided by the need to do substantial justice. Unnecessary and 
prolonged adjournments lead to frustration on the part of the parties and ultimately miscarriage of justice. The 
court may therefore refuse an application for adjournment if in the opinion of the court is designed to delay or 
defeat justice.  See the case of State v. Duke4, Odogwu v. Odogwu5and the case of Ndu v. State6. 
The granting or the refusal of an application for adjournment in a hearing is within the discretion of the court, 
though subject to the trite guiding principles as discussed earlier in this paper, that the discretion must be 
exercised at all times not only judicially but also judiciously on the materials placed before the court and the 
peculiar circumstances of the particular case. See the case of State v. Duke7 and Odogwu v. Odogwu8. An 
appellate court can only set aside the decision of a lower court for exercise of discretion in these circumstances 
where it is shown that the court exercised its discretion wrongly; in that it works manifest injustice against the 
interest or rights of the appellant, or in clear infringement of a law see also Queen v. Onye9 and State v. 
Duke10. 
 
CONCLUSION 
There is hardly any bit of the judicial function that the judge is not equipped with discretionary powers. Even 
where safeguards or conditions, or guidelines or what might appear like limitations to such powers exist, in the 
final analysis the judge is left between himself and his conscience to act accordingly by making decisions that 
best serves the interest of justice. This is so because in certain situations where the law clearly stipulates confines 
for the exercise of a judge’s powers, the judge can still determine his decision in a manner he likes, the only 
other choice for the aggrieved party is to appeal against the decision. The most powerful tool in the hands of the 
judge still remains the discretionary power. It is in the exercise this power that a combination of competence and 
integrity of the judge is put to test. The judge’s sense of justice, fairness and neutrality is exposed.  
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